Bibliografía sobre el especismo
Especismo
Arneson, R. J. (1999) “What, if anything, renders all humans morally equal”, en Jamieson, D. (ed.) Singer and his critics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 103-128.
Boxill, B. R. (1995 [1991]) “Igualdad, discriminación y trato preferente”, en Singer, P. (ed.) Compendio de ética, Madrid, Alianza, pp. 457-468.
Burgess-Jackson, K. (1998) “Doing right by our animal companions”, Journal of Ethics, 2, pp. 159-185.
Cushing, S. (2003) “Against ‘humanism’: Speciesism, personhood and preference”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 34, pp. 556-571.
DeGrazia, D. (1996) Taking animals seriously: Mental life and moral status, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Faria, C. & Paez, E. (2014) “Anthropocentrism and speciesism: Conceptual and normative issues”, Revista de Bioética y Derecho, 32, pp. 95-103 [referencia: 23 de enero de 2016].
Gompertz, L. (1992 [1824]) Moral inquiries on the situation of man and of brutes, London: Open Gate.
Graft, D. (1997) “Against strong speciesism”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14, pp. 107-118.
Holland, A. J. (1984) “On behalf of moderate speciesism”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 20, pp. 281-291.
Horta, O. (2010a) “Discrimination in terms of moral exclusion”, Theoria: Swedish Journal of Philosophy, 76, pp. 346-364 [referencia: 15 de febrero de 2014].
Horta, O. (2020 [2010b]) “¿Qué es el especismo?”, Devenires, 41, pp. 163-198 [referencia: 31 de marzo de 2020].
Kaufman, F. (1998) “Speciesism and the argument from misfortune”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15, pp. 155-163.
LaFollette, H. & Shanks, N. (1996) “The origin of speciesism”, Philosophy, 71, pp. 41-61.
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2006) “Private discrimination: A prioritarian, desert-accommodating account”, San Diego Law Review, 43, pp. 817-856.
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2007) “Discrimination”, en Ryberg, J.; Petersen, T. S. & Wolf, C. (eds.) New waves in applied ethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 51-72.
Mason, J. (1998) “Misothery”, en Bekoff, M. & Meaney, C. A. (eds.) Encyclopedia of animal rights and animal welfare, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, p. 245.
Patterson, C. (2008 [2002]) ¿Por qué maltratamos tanto a los animales?: un modelo para la masacre de personas en los campos de extermino nazis, Lleida: Milenio.
Persson, I. (1993) “A basis for (interspecies) equality”, en Cavalieri, P. & Singer, P. (eds.) The Great Ape Project, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 183-193.
Pluhar, E. (1996) Beyond prejudice: The moral significance of human and nonhuman animals, Durham: Duke University Press.
Regan, T. (1979) “An examination and defense of one argument concerning animal rights”, Inquiry, 22, pp. 189-219.
Ryder, R. D. (2011) Speciesism, painism and happiness: A morality for the twenty-first century, Exeter: Imprint Academic, pp. 38-61.
Sapontzis, S. F. (1987) Morals, reason, and animals, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Sapontzis, S. F. (1990) “The meaning of speciesism and the forms of animal suffering”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, pp. 35-36.
Singer, P. (2018 [1975]) Liberación animal, Barcelona: Taurus.
Spiegel, M. (1988) The dreaded comparison: Human and animal slavery, London: Heretic Books.
Sztybel, D. (2006) “Can the treatment of animals be compared to the Holocaust?”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 11, pp. 97-132.
Vallentyne, P. (2005) “Of mice and men: Equality and animals”, Journal of Ethics, 9, pp. 403-433.
Wasserman, D. (1998) “Discrimination, concept of”, en Chadwick, R. (ed.) Encyclopedia of applied ethics, San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 805-814.
Wilson, S. D. (2005) “The species-norm account of moral status”, Between the Species, 13 (5) [referencia: 27 de agosto de 2012].
Zamir, T. (2007) Ethics and the beast: A speciesist argument for animal rights, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Argumentos contra el especismo
Carruthers, P. (1992) The animal issue: Moral theory in practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferry, L. (1994 [1992]) El nuevo orden ecológico, Barcelona: Tusquets.
Frey, R. G. (1980) Interests and rights: The case against animals, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gaita, R. (2003) The philosopher’s dog: Friendships with animals, London: Routledge.
Goldman, M. (2001) “A trascendental defense of speciesism”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 33, pp. 59-69.
Harrison, P. (1989) “Theodicy and animal pain”, Philosophy, 64, pp. 79-92.
Leahy, M. P. T. (1991) Against liberation: Putting animals in perspective, London: Routledge.
Midgley, M. (1983) Animals and why they matter, Athens: University Georgia Press.
Næss, A. (1989) Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Petrinovich, L. (1999) Darwinian dominion: Animal welfare and human interests, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Posner, R. (2004) “Animal rights: Legal, philosophical and pragmatical perspectives”, en Sunstein, C. & Nussbaum, M. (eds.) Animal rights: Current debates and new directions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 51-77.
Reichmann, J. B. (2000) Evolution, animal ‘rights’ and the environment, Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.
El argumento de la imparcialidad
Baier, K. (1958) The moral point of view: A rational basis of ethics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Barry, B. (1995) Justice as impartiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brandt, R. B. (1954) “The definition of an ‘ideal observer’ in ethics”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15, pp. 407-413.
Brandt, R. B. (1979) A theory of the good and the right, Oxford: Clarendon.
Gert, B. (1995) “Moral impartiality”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 20, pp. 102-127.
Hare, R. M. (1981) Moral thinking, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1977) Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1982) “Morality and the theory of rational behaviour”, en Sen, A. K. & Williams, B. A. O. (eds.) Utilitarianism and beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-62.
Henberg, M. C. (1978) “Impartiality”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8, pp. 715-724.
Horta, O. (2010) “Discrimination in terms of moral exclusion”, Theoria: Swedish Journal of Philosophy, 76, pp. 346-364 [referencia: 13 de febrero de 2014].
Kekes, J. (1981) “Morality and impartiality”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, pp. 295-303.
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2006) “Private discrimination: A prioritarian, desert-accommodating account”, San Diego Law Review, 43, pp. 817-856.
Nagel, T. (1986) The view from nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, T. (1996 [1991]) Igualdad y parcialidad: bases éticas de la teoría política, Barcelona: Paidós Ibérica.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2006) Las fronteras de la justicia: consideraciones sobre la exclusión, Barcelona: Paidós Ibérica.
Opotow, S. (1993) “Animals and the scope of justice”, Journal of Social Issues, 49, pp. 71-86.
Rawls, J. (1997 [1971]) Teoría de la justicia, 2a ed., Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica de España.
Rawls, J. (2002 [2001]) La justicia como equidad: una reformulación, Barcelona: Paidós Ibérica.
Regan, T. & VanDeVeer, D. (eds.) (1982) And justice for all, Totowa: Rowan and Littlefield.
Rowlands, M. (2009 [1998]) Animal rights: Moral, theory and practice, 2nd ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998) What we owe to each other, Cambridge: Belknap.
Sidgwick, H. (1907) The methods of ethics, 7th ed., London: Macmillan [referencia: 15 de abril de 2018].
Singer, P. (1972) “Famine, affluence, and morality”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, pp. 229-243.
Teitelman, M. (1972) “The limits of individualism”, Journal of Philosophy, 69, pp. 545-556.
VanDeVeer, D. (1979) “Of beasts, persons and the original position”, The Monist, 62, pp. 368-377.
VanDeVeer, D. (1987) “Interspecific justice”, The Monist, 22, pp. 55-79.
Wolf, S. (1992) “Morality and partiality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 6, pp. 243-259.
Argumentos circulares
Cohen, M. R.; Nagel, E. & Corcoran, J. (1993) An introduction to logic, Indianapolis: Hackett.
Cushing, S. (2003) “Against ‘humanism’: Speciesism, personhood and preference”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 34, pp. 556-571.
Diamond, C. (1991) “The importance of being human”, en Cockburn, D. (ed.) Human beings, Cambridge: Royal Institute of Philosophy, pp. 35-62.
Gaita, R. (2003) The philosopher’s dog: Friendships with animals, London: Routledge.
Hansen, H. V. & Pinto, R. C. (eds.) (1995) Fallacies: Classical and contemporary readings, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Harrison, P. (1989) “Theodicy and animal pain”, Philosophy, 64, pp. 79-92.
Horta, O. (2010) “What is speciesism?”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 23, pp. 243-266 [referencia: 28 de enero de 2013].
Hsiao, T. (2015) “In defense of eating meat”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 28, pp. 277-291.
Hsiao, T. (2017) “Industrial farming is not cruel to animals”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 02 February.
Hurley, P. J. (2000) A concise introduction to logic, Belmont: Wadsworth.
Kahane, H. & Cavender, N. (2005) Logic and contemporary rhetoric: The use of reason in everyday life, Belmont: Cengage Learning.
Lunsford, A. & Ruszkiewicz, J. (1998) Everything’s an argument, Boston: Bedford.
Machan, T. (2004) Putting humans first: Why we are nature’s favorite, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
Posner, R. A. (2004) “Animal rights: Legal, philosophical and pragmatic perspectives”, en Sunstein, C. & Nussbaum, M. (eds.) Animal rights: Current debates and new directions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 51-77.
Reichmann, J. B. (2000) Evolution, animal ‘rights’ and the environment, Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.
Ryder, R. D. (1989) Animal revolution: Changing attitudes towards speciesism, Oxford: Blackwell.
Singer, P. (2004) “Ethics beyond species and beyond instincts: A response to Richard Posner”, en Sunstein, C. & Nussbaum, M. (eds.) Animal rights: Current debates and new directions, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 78-92.
Waldau, P. (2002) The specter of speciesism: Buddhist and Christian views of animals, New York: Oxford University Press.
Waldau, P. (2006) A communion of subjects: Animals in religion, science, and ethics, New York: Columbia University Press.
El argumento de la superposición de especies
Arneson, R. J. (1999) “What, if anything, renders all humans morally equal”, en Jamieson, D. (ed.) Singer and his critics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 103-128.
Bastian, B.; Loughnan, S.; Haslam, N. & Radke, H. R. (2012) “Don’t mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, pp. 247-256.
Becker, L. C. (1983) “The priority of human interests”, en Miller, H. B. & Williams, W. (eds.) Ethics and animals, Clifton: Humana Press, pp. 225-242.
Bentham, J. (1996 [1907]) Introduction to the principles of moral and legislation, Oxford: Clarendon, p. 282n.
Bernstein, J. H. (1998) On moral considerability: An essay on who morally matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Callicott, J. B. (1989) In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy, Albany: The State University of New York Press.
Carruthers, P. (2003 [1992]) La cuestión de los animales: teoría de la moral aplicada, Tres Cantos: Akal.
Cushing, S. (2003) “Against ‘humanism’: Speciesism, personhood and preference”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 34, pp. 556-571.
DeGrazia, D. (1996) Taking animals seriously: Mental life and moral status, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dombrowski, D. A. (1997) Babies and beasts: The argument from marginal cases, Chicago: University of Illinois.
Ehnert, J. (2002) The argument from species overlap, tesis de máster, Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University [referencia: 23 de agosto de 2018].
Francis, L. P. & Norman, R. (1978) “Some animals are more equal than others”, Philosophy, 53, pp. 507-527.
Frey, R. G. & Paton, William (1989) “Vivisection, morals and medicine: An exchange”, en Regan, T. & Singer, P. (eds.) Animal rights and human obligations, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, pp. 223-226.
Horta, O. (2010) “What is speciesism?”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 23, pp. 243-266 [referencia: 28 de enero de 2013].
Horta, O. (2014) “The scope of the argument from species overlap”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31, pp. 142-154 [referencia: 25 de octubre de 2014].
Kaufman, F. (1998) “Speciesism and the argument from misfortune”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15, pp. 155-163.
Leahy, M. P. T. (1991) Against liberation: Putting animals in perspective, London: Routledge.
McCloskey, H. J. (1979) “Moral rights and animals”, Inquiry, 22, pp. 23-54.
McMahan, J. (1996) “Cognitive disability, misfortune, and justice”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25, pp. 3-35.
McMahan, J. (2002) The ethics of killing: Problems at the margins of life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Midgley, M. (1983) Animals and why they matter, Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Narveson, J. (1977) “Animal rights”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7, pp. 161-178.
Narveson, J. (1987) “On a case for animal rights”, The Monist, 70, pp. 31-49.
Petrinovich, L. (1999) Darwinian dominion: Animal welfare and human interests, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Pluhar, E. (1987) “The personhood view and the argument from marginal cases”, Philosophica, 39, pp. 23-38.
Pluhar, E. (1996) Beyond prejudice: The moral significance of human and nonhuman animals, Durham: Duke University Press.
Porfirio (1984 [ca. 280]) Sobre la abstinencia, Madrid: Gredos
Regan, T. (1979) “An examination and defense of one argument concerning animal rights”, Inquiry, 22, pp. 189-219.
Singer, P. (2011 [1975]) Liberación animal, Madrid: Taurus.
Wilson, S. D. (2005) “The species-norm account of moral status”, Between the Species, 13 (5) [referencia: 13 de febrero de 2013].
El argumento de la relevancia
Becker, L. C. (1983) “The priority of human interests”, en Miller, H. B. & Williams, W. H. (eds.) Ethics and animals, Clifton: Humana Press, pp. 225-242.
Bernstein, M. H. (1998) On moral considerability: An essay on who morally matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bernstein, M. H. (2002) “Marginal cases and moral relevance”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 33, pp. 523-539.
Bernstein, M. H. (2004) “Neo-Speciesism”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 35, pp. 380-390.
Callicott, J. B. (1989) In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Carruthers, P. (2003 [1992]) La cuestión de los animales: teoría de la moral aplicada, Tres Cantos: Akal.
Comstock, G. (1992) “The moral irrelevance of autonomy”, Between the Species, 8, pp. 15-27.
Cushing, S. (2003) “Against ‘humanism’: Speciesism, personhood and preference”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 34, pp. 556-571.
DeGrazia, D. (1996) Taking animals seriously: Mental life and moral status, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Diamond, C. (1991) “The importance of being human”, en Cockburn, D. (ed.) Human beings, Cambridge: Royal Institute of Philosophy, pp. 35-62.
Ehnert, J. (2002) The argument from species overlap, tesis de máster, Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University [referencia: 23 de agosto de 2018].
Francis, L. P. & Norman, R. (1978) “Some animals are more equal than others”, Philosophy, 53, pp. 507-527.
Gaita, R. (2003) The philosopher’s dog: Friendships with animals, London: Routledge.
Goldman, M. (2001) “A transcendental defense of speciesim”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 35, pp. 59-69.
Hare, R. M. (1989) “Relevance”, en Hare, R. M. Essays in ethical theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 191-211.
Horta, O. (2010) “What is speciesism?”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 23, pp. 243-266 [referencia: 28 de enero de 2013].
Horta, O. (2018) “Moral considerability and the argument from relevance”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 31, pp. 369-388 [referencia: 14 de julio de 2018].
Leahy, M. P. T. (1991) Against liberation: Putting animals in perspective, London: Routledge.
McCloskey, H. J. (1979) “Moral rights and animals”, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 22, pp. 23-54.
McMahan, J. (1996) “Cognitive disability, misfortune, and justice”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25, pp. 3-35.
Midgley, M. (1983) Animals and why they matter, Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Narveson, J. (1999) Moral matters, Toronto: Broadview. Goldman, M. (2001) “A transcendental defense of speciesim”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 35, pp. 59-69.
Petrinovich, L. (1999) Darwinian dominion: Animal welfare and human interests, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pluhar, E. B. (1988) “Is there a morally relevant difference between human and animal nonpersons?”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 1, pp. 59-68.
Pluhar, E. B. (1995) Beyond prejudice: The moral significance of human and nonhuman animals, Durham: Duke University Press.
Posner, R. A. (2004) “Animal rights: Legal, philosophical and pragmatical perspectives”, en Sunstein, C. R. & Nussbaum, M. (eds.) Animal rights: Current debates and new directions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 51-77.
Robinson, W. S. (1997) “Some nonhuman animals can have pains in a morally relevant sense”, Biology and Philosophy, 12, pp. 51-71.
Ryder, R. D. (1975) Victims of science: The use of animals in research, London: Davis-Poynter.
Ryder, R. D. (1998) “Speciesism”, en Bekoff, M. & Meaney, C. A. (eds.) Encyclopaedia of animal rights and animal welfare, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, p. 320.
Sapontzis, S. F. (1987) Morals, reason, and animals, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Singer, P. (2011 [1975]) Liberación animal, Madrid: Taurus.
Intuiciones y prejuicios morales
Andow, J. (2016) “Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions”, Philosophical Psychology, 29, pp. 904-911.
Bastian, B.; Loughnan, S.; Haslam, N. & Radke, H. R. (2012) “Don’t mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, pp. 247-256.
Bedke, M. S. (2008) “Ethical intuitions: What they are, what they are not, and how they justify”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 43, pp. 253-270 [referencia: 25 de marzo de 2017].
Bedke, M. S. (2010) “Intuitional epistemology in ethics”, Philosophy Compass, 5, pp. 1069-1083.
Bengson, J. (2013) “Experimental attacks on intuitions and answers”, Phenomenological Research, 86, pp. 495-532.
Braddock, M. (2016) “Evolutionary debunking: Can moral realists explain the reliability of our moral judgments?”, Philosophical Psychology, 29, pp. 844-857.
Cappelen, H. (2012) Philosophy without intuitions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Caviola, L.; Everett, J. A. & Faber, N. S. (2019) “The moral standing of animals: Towards a psychology of speciesism”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 116, pp. 1011-1029.
Daniels, N. (1996) Justice and justification: Reflective equilibrium in theory and practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ehnert, J. (2002) The argument from species overlap, tesis de máster, Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University [referencia: 23 de agosto de 2018].
Foot, P. (1967) “The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect”, Oxford Review, 5, pp. 5-15 [referencia: 25 de marzo de 2017].
Greene, J. D. (2013) Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them, New York: Penguin.
Greene, J. D.; Sommerville, R. B.; Nystrom, L. E.; Darley, J. M. & Cohen, J. D. (2001) “An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment”, Science, 293, pp. 2105-2108.
Horta, O. (2014) “The scope of the argument from species overlap”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31, pp. 142-154 [referencia: 25 de octubre de 2014].
Jaquet, F. (2021) “A debunking argument against speciesism”, Synthese, 198, pp. 1011-1027.
Jaquet, F. (2022) “Speciesism and tribalism: Embarrassing origins”, Philosophical Studies, 179, pp. 933-954.
Lillehammer, H. (2011) “The epistemology of ethical intuitions”, Philosophy, 86, pp. 175-200.
McMahan, J. (2005) “Our fellow creatures”, Journal of Ethics, 9, pp. 353-380.
McMahan, J. (2010) “Moral intuition”, en LaFollette, H. (ed.) The Blackwell guide to ethical theory, Malden: Blackwell, pp. 92-110.
Nagel, J. (2012) “Intuitions and experiments: A defense of the case method in epistemology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85, pp. 495-527.
Pluhar, E. B. (1995) Beyond prejudice: The moral significance of human and nonhuman animals, Durham: Duke University Press.
Rawls, J. (1951) “Outline of a decision procedure for ethics”, Philosophical Review, 60, pp. 177-197;
Rawls, J. (1999 [1971]) A theory of justice, rev. ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ross, W. D. (2002 [1930]) The right and the good, Oxford: Clarendon.
Sencerz, S. (1986) “Moral intuitions and justification in ethics”, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Traditions, 50, pp. 77-95.
Singer, P. (1974) “Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium”, The Monist, 58, pp. 490-517.
Singer, P. (2004) “Ethics beyond species and beyond instincts: A response to Richard Posner”, en Sunstein, C. & Nussbaum, M. (eds.) Animal rights: Current debates and new directions, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 78-92
Singer, P. (2005) “Ethics and intuitions”, The Journal of Ethics, 95, pp. 331-352.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W.; Young, L. & Cushman, F. (2010) “Moral intuitions”, en Doris, J. M. (ed.) The moral psychology handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 246-272.
Sosa, E. (2007) “Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition”, Philosophical Studies, 13, pp. 99-107
Stratton-Lake, P. (ed.) (2002) Ethical intuitionism: Re-evaluations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Street, S. (2006) “A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value”, Philosophical Studies, 127, pp. 109-166.
Tersman, F. (2008) “The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86, pp. 389-405.
Thomson, J. J. (1976) “Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem”, The Monist, 59, pp. 204-217.
Thomson, J. J. (1985) “The trolley problem”, Yale Law Journal, 94, pp. 1395-1415.
Unger, P. (1996) Living high and letting die, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. & Allman, J. (2007) “Moral intuition: Its neural substrates and normative significance”, Journal of Physiology (Paris), 101, pp. 179-202.
