All beings who can have positive and negative experiences have an interest in being positively affected and in not being negatively affected. In other words, they have an interest in having their wellbeing maximized and their suffering minimized. Sentient animals, therefore, have an interest in not suffering and in being able to enjoy their lives. Being able to enjoy their lives entails, among other things, that they have an interest in not being killed, so they have the opportunity to have positive experiences.
However, most people assume that if we should consider the interests of others then we should focus on helping other humans rather than nonhuman animals. The usual reason given is that the interests of humans are more important than those of other animals. In particular, this idea is defended because of the many different harms that are suffered in the world by human beings.
A common answer to this is that caring for humans should not exclude caring for other animals as well. However, this is only a partial answer, since it doesn’t address the claim that the interests of nonhuman animals are not very important. Of course, many people reject caring for nonhuman animals because they have a speciesist viewpoint, but as the arguments against speciesism shows, such arguments don’t work. However, people can defend a disregard for nonhuman animals, even if they don’t accept speciesism, if they think that nonhuman interests have less weight than those of humans.
There are two main things we have to consider when assessing the weight of animal interests.
First of all, we must consider whether they are beings who can have positive and negative experiences. Animal sentience explains the arguments used to evaluate this question. The arguments show that we have sound reasons to conclude that all animals with a centralized nervous system are potentially sentient, and that for many of them the evidence for it is overwhelming, for behavioral, evolutionary and in particular physiological reasons (as explained in indicators of animal suffering). In addition we must bear in mind that, as explained in animal interests, human interests aren’t more important than those of nonhuman animals because we can suffer in certain psychological ways. Physical suffering and enjoyment aren’t less significant than psychological suffering and enjoyment, and, moreover, many nonhuman animals are capable of psychological suffering and enjoyment as well.
Second, once we have acknowledged that nonhuman animals can be harmed and benefited in significant ways, just as humans can, we need to know what their actual situation is. Upon examination we see that the harms they suffer really are enormous. This is true in two different ways:
For these reasons, we have to conclude that the weight of the interests of all these animals is massive. We can only dismiss the interests of nonhuman animals if we assume a blatantly speciesist view that only humans matter.
What we have seen above provides sufficient reasons to not cause nonhuman animals to suffer and to not impede their enjoyment. Nonhuman animals have very important interests in not being harmed. In addition, the same reasons entail that animals have an interest in having their suffering prevented and their positive wellbeing promoted. So if we care about nonhuman animals, we can refrain from causing them to suffer and also promote their enjoyment. We can also try to prevent negative things from occurring to them. The table below summarizes how our actions towards nonhuman sentient beings can be classified:6
Negative for animals |
Positive for animals |
|
Causing something |
To cause them to suffer |
To cause them to enjoy |
Obstructing |
To obstruct or end their enjoyment |
To obstruct or end their suffering |
Stopping an obstruction |
To stop something from occurring that obstructs or alleviates their suffering |
To save them from something that obstructs or eliminates their enjoyment |
Letting be |
To let their suffering occur |
To let their enjoyment occur |
Letting an obstruction be |
To let an obstruction to their enjoyment occur |
To let an obstruction to their suffering occur |
This table shows that we can do more than just refrain from causing suffering to nonhuman animals; we can also act in other ways towards them, and in particular to help them when we are able to reduce their suffering and promote their happiness. And as we have seen here, we have very good reasons to do so.
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6 On a related classification of our different duties towards others and on why they come altogether see Kagan, S. (1989) The limits of morality, Oxford: Clarendon University Press.