Bibliografía sobre la relevancia de la sintiencia

El argumento de la relevancia

Becker, L. C. (1983) “The priority of human interests”, en Miller, H. B. & Williams, W. H. (eds.) Ethics and animals, Clifton: Humana Press, pp. 225-242.

Bernstein, M. H. (1998) On moral considerability: An essay on who morally matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bernstein, M. H. (2002) “Marginal cases and moral relevance”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 33, pp. 523-539.

Bernstein, M. H. (2004) “Neo-Speciesism”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 35, pp. 380-390.

Callicott, J. B. (1989) In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Carruthers, P. (2003 [1992]) La cuestión de los animales: teoría de la moral aplicada, Madrid: Akal.

Comstock, G. (1992) “The moral irrelevance of autonomy”, Between the Species, 8, pp. 15-27.

Cushing, S. (2003) “Against ‘humanism’: Speciesism, personhood and preference”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 34, pp. 556-571.

DeGrazia, D. (1996) Taking animals seriously: Mental life and moral status, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diamond, C. (1991) “The importance of being human”, en Cockburn, D. (ed.) Human beings, Cambridge: Royal Institute of Philosophy, pp. 35-62.

Ehnert, J. (2002) The argument from species overlap, master’s thesis, Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

Francis, L. P. & Norman, R. (1978) “Some animals are more equal than others”, Philosophy, 53, pp. 507-527.

Gaita, R. (2003) The philosophers dog: Friendships with animals, London: Routledge.

Goldman, M. (2001) “A transcendental defense of speciesim”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 35, pp. 59-69.

Hare, R. M. (1989) “Relevance”, en Hare, R. M. Essays in ethical theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 191-211.

Horta, O. (2010) “What is speciesism?”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 23, pp. 243-266 [referencia: 30 de mayo de 2013].

Leahy, M. P. T. (1991) Against liberation: Putting animals in perspective, London: Routledge.

McCloskey, H. J. (1979) “Moral rights and animals”, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 22, pp. 23-54.

McMahan, J. (1996) “Cognitive disability, misfortune, and justice”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25, pp. 3-35.

Midgley, M. (1983) Animals and why they matter, Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Narveson, J. (1999) Moral matters, Toronto: Broadview. Goldman, M. (2001) “A transcendental defense of speciesim”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 35, pp. 59-69.

Petrinovich, L. (1999) Darwinian dominion: Animal welfare and human interests, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Pluhar, E. B. (1988) “Is there a morally relevant difference between human and animal nonpersons?”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 1, pp. 59-68.

Pluhar, E. B. (1995) Beyond prejudice: The moral significance of human and nonhuman animals, Durham: Duke University Press.

Posner, R. A. (2004) “Animal rights: Legal, philosophical and pragmatical perspectives”, en Sunstein, C. R. & Nussbaum, M. (eds.) Animal rights: Current debates and new directions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 51-77.

Robinson, W. S. (1997) “Some nonhuman animals can have pains in a morally relevant sense”, Biology and Philosophy, 12, pp. 51-71.

Ryder, R. D. (1975) Victims of science: The use of animals in research, London: Davis-Poynter.

Ryder, R. D. (1998) “Speciesism”, en Bekoff, M. & Meaney, C. A. (eds.) Encyclopaedia of animal rights and animal welfare, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, p. 320.

Sapontzis, S. F. (1987) Morals, reason, and animals, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Singer, P. (2018 [1975]) Liberación animal, Barcelona: Taurus.

Por qué deberíamos tener en consideración moral a los seres sintientes, en lugar de a los seres vivos

Agar, N. (1997) “Biocentrism and the concept of life”, Ethics, 108, pp. 147-168.

Agar, N. (2001) Life’s intrinsic value: Science, ethics, and nature, New York: Columbia University Press.

Attfield, R. (1981) “The good of trees”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 15, pp. 35-54.

Attfield, R. (1987) “Biocentrism, moral standing and moral significance”, Philosophica, 39, pp. 47-58.

DesJardins, J. R. (2013 [1993]) Environmental ethics: An introduction to environmental philosophy, 5th rev. ed., Boston: Wadsworth.

Himma, K. E. (2004) “Moral biocentrism and the adaptive value of consciousness”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 42, pp. 25-44.

Goodpaster, K. E. (1978) “On being morally considerable”, Journal of Philosophy, 75, pp. 308-325.

Schweitzer, A. (1946 [1923]) Civilization and ethics, 3d ed., London: A. & C. Black.

Taylor, P. (1983) “In defense of biocentrism”, Environmental Ethics, 5, pp. 237-243.

Taylor, P. (1986) Respect for nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Varner, G. (2002) “Biocentric individualism”, en Schmidtz, D. & Willot, E. (eds.) Environmental ethics: What really matters, what really works, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 108-120.

Por qué deberíamos tener en consideración moral a los seres sintientes, en lugar de a los ecosistemas

Baxter, B. H. (1996) “Ecocentrism and persons”, Environmental Values, 5, pp. 205-219.

Callicott, J. B. (1989) In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B. (1990) “The case against moral pluralism”, Environmental Ethics, 12, pp. 99-124.

Callicott, J. B. (2000) “The land ethic”, en Jamieson, D. (ed.) A companion to environmental philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 204-217.

Callicott, J. B. (1999) Beyond the land ethic: More essays in environmental philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Crisp, R. (1998) “Animal liberation is not an environmental ethic: A response to Dale Jamieson”, Environmental Values, 7, pp. 476-478.

Eckersley, R. (1992) Environmentalism and political theory: Toward an ecocentric approach, Albany: State University of New York.

Fieser, J. (1993) “Callicott and the metaphysical basis of ecocentric morality”, Environmental Ethics, 15, pp. 171-180.

Fox, W. (1995) Toward a transpersonal ecology: Developing new foundations for environmentalism, Albany: State University of New York.

Hargrove, E. C. (ed.) (1992) The animal rights/environmental ethics debate: The environmental perspective, Albany: State University of New York.

Hettinger, N. & Throop, B. (1999) “Refocusing ecocentrism”, Environmental Ethics, 21, pp. 3-21.

Horta, O. (2015 [2010]) “Contra la ética de la ecología del miedo: Por un cambio en los fines de la intervención en la naturaleza”, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Críticos Animales, 2 (1), pp. 61-85 [referencia: 14 de diciembre de 2016].

Johnson, E. (1981) “Animal liberation versus the Land Ethic”, Environmental Ethics, 3, pp. 265-273.

Johnson, L. E. (1993) A morally deep world: An essay on moral significance and environmental ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 142.

Leopold, A. (1999 [1949]) Una ética para la Tierra, Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata.

Linkola, P. (2009) Can life prevail?: A radical approach to the environmental crisis, London: Integral Tradition.

Pianka, E. R. The vanishing book of life on Earth [referencia: 11 de enero de 2013].

Rolston, H., III (1999) “Respect for life: Counting what Singer finds of no account”, en Jamieson, D. (ed.) Singer and his critics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 247-268.

Schmidtz, D. & Willott, E. (2002) Environmental ethics: What really matters, what really works, New York: Oxford University Press.

Shelton, J.-A. (2004) “Killing animals that don’t fit in: Moral dimensions of habitat restoration”, Between the Species, 13 (4) [referencia: 30 de enero de 2013].

Varner, G. (1991) “No holism without pluralism”, Environmental Ethics, 13, pp. 175-179.

Wade, M. L. (1990) “Animal liberation, ecocentrism, and the morality of sport hunting”, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 17, pp. 15-27.

Warren, M. A. (2000) Moral status: Obligations to persons and other livings things, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Por qué deberíamos tener en consideración moral a los individuos, en lugar de a las especies

Callicott, J. B. (1980) “Animal liberation: A triangular affair”, Environmental Ethics, 2, pp. 311-338.

Callicott, J. B. (1993) “On the intrinsic value of nonhuman species”, en Armstrong, S. & Botzler, R. (eds.) Environmental ethics: Divergence and convergence, New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 66-70.

Czech, B.; Devers, P. K. & Krausman, P. R. (2001) “The relationship of gender to species conservation attitudes”, Wildlife Society Bulletin, 29, pp. 187-194.

Eckersley, R. (1992) Environmentalism and political theory: Toward an ecocentric approach, Albany: State University of New York.

Faria, C. (2011) “Sobre o bem de tudo e de todos: a conjunção impossível entre ambientalismo e libertação animal”, Ágora: Papeles de Filosofía, 30 (2), pp. 27-41 [referencia: 15 de diciembre de 2012].

Gunnthorsdottir, A. (2001) “Physical attractiveness of an animal species as a decision factor for its preservation”, Anthrozoös, 14, pp. 204-215.

Horta, O. (2010) “Contra la ética de la ecología del miedo: Por un cambio en los fines de la intervención en la naturaleza, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Críticos Animales, 2 (1), pp. 61-85 [referencia: 14 de diciembre de 2016].

Johnson, L. (1991) A morally deep world: An essay on moral significance and environmental ethics, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, L. E. (1995) “Species: On their nature and moral standing”, Journal of Natural History, 29, pp. 843-849.

Kellert, S. R. (1985) “Social and perceptual factors in endangered species management”, Journal of Wildlife Management, 49, pp. 528-536.

Maftei, M. (2014) “What anti-speciesism isn’t”, medium.com, Jun. 26 [referencia: 1 de julio de 2014].

Rolston, H., III (1985) “Duties to endangered species”, BioScience, 35, pp. 718-726.

Rolston, H., III (1986) Philosophy gone wild: Essays in environmental ethics, Buffalo: Prometheus.

Rolston, H., III (1987) Environmental ethics: Duties to and values in the natural world, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Rolston, H., III (1999) “Respect for life: Counting what Singer finds of no account”, en Jamieson, D. (ed.) Singer and his critics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 247-268.

Rossow, L. M. (1981) “Why do species matter?”, Environmental Ethics, 3, pp. 101-102.

Shelton, J.-A. (2004) “Killing animals that don’t fit in: Moral dimensions of habitat restoration”, Between the Species, 13 (4) [referencia: 3 de marzo de 2013].

Vinding, M. (2014) A Copernican revolution in ethics, Los Gatos: Smashwords [pp. 25-26, referencia: 1 de julio de 2014].

Warren, M. A. (2000) Moral status: Obligations to persons and other livings things, Oxford: Oxford University Press.